The impact of private equity on employment: the consequences of fund country of origin - new evidence from France by Guery, Loris et al.
The impact of private equity on 
employment: the consequences of fund 
country of origin ­ new evidence from 
France 
Article 
Accepted Version 
Guery, L., Stevenot, A., Wood, G. T. and Brewster, C. (2017) 
The impact of private equity on employment: the 
consequences of fund country of origin ­ new evidence from 
France. Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and 
Society, 56 (4). pp. 723­750. ISSN 0019­8676 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1111/irel.12193 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/72427/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work.  See Guidance on citing .
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/irel.12193 
Publisher: Wiley­Blackwell 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
Country of Origin and Private Equity 
 1 
Country of origin effects and new financial actors: Private Equity 
investment and work and employment practices of French firms 
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Abstract: 
This is a study of the effects of alternative investors on a range of work and employment 
practices in France, paying specific attention to whether investors are indigenous or not. We 
use data from a detailed survey of French firms, and set our research in the context of the 
literature on comparative capitalisms. We find that PE investments from abroad are associated 
with greater job insecurity, less spending on training, and lower wages, but French PE 
investments are not. We explore the reasons behind this variation, and the implications for 
theory and practice. 
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1. Introduction 
The implications of new financial actors for companies and employees is of growing concern 
in the field of management and employment relations, including interest from an international 
perspective (Gospel & Pendleton 2014). In a recent article published in this journal, Appelbaum 
et al. (2013) carried out four case studies for analysing the effect of private equity funding on 
work and employment relations. Their results suggest that these new financial actors “are not 
particularly embedded in, or constrained by, national business systems” (p.515).  
In this article, we focus on French companies where a financial firm (alternative investors, most 
commonly Private Equity [PE]) holds a majority stake, and accord particular attention to 
whether the firm is indigenous or not. There is a growing body of literature that suggests PE 
will have significant and far reaching effects on the work and employment practices of target 
organizations; and there is much controversy as to whether such buyouts prejudice employees 
(see, for example, Appelbaum & Batt 2014; Bacon et al. 2010; Bacon et al. 2012; Chambost et 
al. 2008; Clark 2013; Goergen et al. 2014).  However, much of the literature has tended to focus 
on the case of liberal market economies, on overall employment effects, and on indigenous 
private equity players. By comparing the effects of French and foreign PE investment in French 
companies on temporary employment, compensation and training, this study seeks to contribute 
to the emerging literature on cross national PE investments, and the effect of PE on work and 
employment relations. It brings to bear new evidence from France, supplementing an emerging 
body of literature on private equity in continental Europe (c.f. Bacon et al. 2012; Boselie & 
Koene 2010). 
The Varieties of Capitalism literature (Hall & Soskice 2001; Lane & Wood 2012) argues that, 
in general, the Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) are associated with a primary emphasis on 
shareholder value. In LMEs job protection is lower and unions weaker.  In more Coordinated 
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Markets (CMEs), this is mediated through stronger stakeholder rights. France has been 
categorized in numerous different ways, from a coordinated market economy (CME), through 
a CME that is liberalizing, to state directed capitalism (Hall & Soskice 2001; Schmidt 2000). 
A recent study by Witt et al. (2017) reveals that, in terms of a range of regulator and macro-
economic features, France is closer to the Mediterranean and East European EU member states 
than either an LME or a CME; such economies are characterized by weaker institutional 
coupling and more room for innovation. Nevertheless, a feature of the country is that 
employment protection and union rights are relatively strong. The case of France is of particular 
interest given the history of the higher levels of coordination found there than in Liberal Market 
Economies (LMEs), a distinct body of corporate law, and the widespread assumption that the 
French model is in flux (Culpepper 2005) and, hence, particularly vulnerable to pressures from 
abroad. France is also the second largest investment market for private equity in Europe1. 
Although there is an extensive literature on country of origin and domicile effects in the case 
of firms crossing national boundaries, it has tended to focus on differences between the 
contextual circumstances of firm headquarters versus the country of domicile, rather than the 
country of origin of investors (Brewster et al. 2008; Edwards et al. 2007; Edwards & Kuruvilla 
2005), and the relative strength of ties between the investor and local actors (Jackson & Deeg 
2008).  However, overseas investors may play an important role in initiating and accelerating 
systemic change (Dore 2008).  In addition to country of origin effects, local players are likely 
to have denser ties to other local actors, which may encourage them to stick to tried and tested 
national recipes (Jackson & Deeg 2008; Morgan 2012). Earlier work by Guery et al. (2017) 
indicated that PE investment from overseas was likely to lead to job cuts, in contrast with 
French PE investments; we supplement and extend this analysis to cover a wider range of work 
and employment practices. It is argued that PE investment is characterized by high levels of 
debt leverage (Cumming et al. 2007), whereas venture capital investment focuses on early stage 
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companies which typically lack the assets enabling the same degree of debt leverage, and they 
are excluded from the main part of our study (c.f. Bottazzi & Da Rin  (2002). However, as an 
additional robustness check, we also included such firms in our analysis, in order to confirm 
the distinct consequences of private equity.  This study focuses on mature firms, as this has 
been the scene of most controversy. The analyses are based on a sample of 964 mature 
workplaces belonging to the 2010-2011 REPONSE dataset.  We accord particular attention to 
the use of temporary employment, to training expenditures, and to the use of restriction, 
freezing or decrease of compensation levels, all indicators of the relative interdependence of 
employers and employees (Brewster et al. 2008; Whitley 1999).    
2. Private Equity, Work and Employment 
There is a growing body of research on the consequences of private equity takeovers on firm 
performance and employment.  Cushen & Thompson (2016) note that alternative investors 
represent an important vehicle for introducing financialization into non-financial corporations.  
It has been argued that a PE takeover will result in more effective management, so that even if 
there are short-term job cuts, employees can look forward with greater confidence to the long 
term (Wilson et al. 2012). Looking at evidence from 3200 target firms, Davis et al. (2014) found 
that modest initial job losses were followed by a tendency to more radical upsizing and 
downsizing than that encountered in the period leading up to the takeover.  Wilson et al. (2012) 
argued that both prior to and after the onset of the financial crisis that began in 2008, PE owned 
firms outperformed firms not subject to a takeover in terms of job creation potential. Wright et 
al. (2009) conclude that the bulk of research evidence suggests that in the long-term initial job 
losses following PE takeovers were compensated for by later hiring once necessary adjustments 
had been performed. Harris et al. (2005) found that management buy-outs (MBOs) are 
associated with a shift to less labour intensive production, outsourcing, and the shift of 
resources towards the most productive areas of activity.  Wright et al. (2000) argue that PE 
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takeovers accord managers more room to adopt ‘entrepreneurial mindsets’, which could include 
forging new accommodations with employees and introducing policies aimed at enhancing 
commitment. 
However, a large component of the mainstream employment relations literature is much more 
sceptical.  It has been suggested that PE takeovers rashly liquidate accumulated assets, discount 
the value of the capabilities of existing staff, saddle the firm with excess debt, lead to large 
scale job losses, and endanger the firm’s continued existence  (see, for example, Appelbaum et 
al. 2013; Clark 2013).  Clark (2009a) argues that PE is fundamentally disruptive to established 
employment relations through, inter alia, eroding the principle of managerial discretion.  Based 
on four redistribution-level case studies in the UK, Appelbaum et al. (2013) found that PE 
takeovers were associated with breaches of trust and breaches of implicit contracts: in other 
words, they eroded the basis of employer-employee interdependence.  Contrary to what is held 
by agency theory, they argue that PE takeovers are not ‘welfare neutral’, having a more radical 
approach to shareholder value that further erodes the position of other stakeholders (e.g. Heyes 
et al. 2012). This means that PE may not only undermine the interdependence of employees 
and the firm, but also change the extent of delegation to employees (Clark 2007, 2009b).  Rather 
than following a defined template, PE is associated with open-ended transformation of both 
relations with managers and employment relations generally (Clark 2013). Goergen et al. 
(2014) found that those investors were associated with greater job shedding, reduced 
productivity and poorer overall organizational performance.  
Most of the existing work on PE does not look at country of origin effects, and assumes that PE 
will have similar effects irrespective of national context (Appelbaum et al. 2013).   Indeed, 
Bacon et al. (2012) found that rather than national origin, a key determinant of PE effects on 
HRM was envisaged investment time scale: longer term investment horizons being associated 
with a greater propensity to introduce HPWPs. Other work on country of origin effects and PE 
Country of Origin and Private Equity 
 6 
primarily concentrates on financial and strategic, rather than work and employment, issues 
(Bruining & Wright 2002; Engel & Stiebale 2014; Meuleman & Wright 2011).  Bedu and 
Montalban (2013) found that countries with low levels of employment protection were 
particularly attractive to leverage buy-out orientated PE, suggesting that the business model 
depended on the ability to readily shed labour.  However, in France, recent work indicates that 
the effects of PE on overall employment were different between French and overseas PE: the 
effects of French PE on employment were no different to any other French investor, whilst job 
losses were greater in the case of foreign PE (Guery et al., 2017).  We add to this work through 
exploring the effects of private equity on the relative propensity to make use of temporary 
labour, to restrict, freeze or decrease compensation levels, and to invest in training.  
3. Institutions, Country of Origin and Domicile 
As the literature on comparative capitalisms (Jackson & Deeg 2008; Thelen 2014) alerts us, 
whilst there are dominant forces in the global capitalist ecosystem, these continue to be 
mediated or reformed through embedded institutional arrangements at regional, national, and 
supra-national levels (Jessop 2012); firms will tailor their strategies and practices to reap the 
advantages of local complementarities (e.g. the Varieties of Capitalism approach of Hall & 
Soskice 2001; Hancke et al. 2007). More recently, it has been argued that firms (or, indeed, 
investors) that cross national boundaries are at best only partially embedded within individual 
institutional regimes: firms will seek to reconcile the benefits of fitting in with local production 
regimes with the need for internal organizational coherence and the desire to gain the maximum 
benefits from potential global mobility (Morgan 2012).  Whilst the French national context, for 
example, has many features that are distinct from other institutional regimes, it has been argued 
that market arrangements are mediated and coordinated through state interventions (Hall & 
Soskice 2001; Hancke et al. 2007).  Hence, foreign investors may have to temper their agendas 
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when entering France, in line with national corporate law and/ or in order to be able to gain 
some of the specific benefits that accrue from the local regulatory environment.   
4. Private Equity,  Work and Employment practices, and country of origin effects: 
hypotheses 
Divergences in PE industries 
The French PE industry is different from the Anglo-Saxon PE industries, and these divergences 
might suggest that their influences on the management of the companies funded by PE are 
different (Bruton et al. 2010). For example, in the UK and in the USA, PE and venture capital 
firms as a rule are independent institutions, and their main sources of finance include pension 
funds, insurance companies and other institutional investors (Kaplan et al. 2007). Such PE firms 
exist of course in France, but others tend to be subsidiaries of banks and other financial 
institutions (so-called captives) (Mayer et al., 2005). Others are also linked to governmental 
agencies. These approaches are less common in France than the European average (around 
13.5% of the total fundraising vs. 38%, EVCA 2014), but significant compared to the UK 
private equity industry for example, where such fundraising is almost non-existent (1.6% of the 
total fundraising, EVCA 2014). These investors’ objectives could be broader than just finance. 
Bpifrance, the main public investment group with the French state as shareholder, introduces 
itself as a socially responsible investor in its doctrine of intervention (Bpifrance 2013), taking 
into account the impact of funded companies on their stakeholders, including in terms of 
territorial employment and development.  
Syndication is also a point of divergence. Some case studies, focused on venture capital 
(Dubocage & Galindo 2008), or encompassing venture capital and PE (Stevenot 2007), 
underline the importance of syndication in the French context. As French PE partnerships are 
generally smaller than American or British ones, PE investments frequently require a syndicate 
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of investors. Consequently, the same pool of investors in PE frequently participate in deals 
involving each other. The consequence is reputational effects. PE firms aspire to be active long-
term players in the industry, which depends on their reputational capital, a precious resource in 
the competitive PE industry which is beset by considerable information asymmetries between 
PEs and their investors, as well as between PE firms and backed companies (Nahata 2010). A 
good reputation is therefore critical for PE firms because it helps in developing useful working 
relationships with entrepreneurs, lawyers, investment bankers, auditors, and others who provide 
useful services to portfolio companies (Sahlman 1990). A good reputation is also critical in the 
relationship between PE firms and in the capacity for a PE of being part of further syndications, 
Wright and Lockett (2003) showing that non-legal sanctions in syndications, such as 
reputational damage, are important for ensuring cooperation. Given that a majority of PE deals 
in France involve the formation of PE syndicates, one can suppose that reputational effects in 
the PE industry are very strong. Furthermore, and maybe due to syndication, the venture capital 
and PE monitoring of investments is weaker in France than in countries like the UK (Sapienza 
et al., 1996). For all these reasons, French PE is probably less likely to creature pressure for 
reducing costs and increasing labour flexibility as part of value extraction.  
Private Equity and Temporary Employment 
For employers, particularly in countries where employment law is extensive, temporary 
employment provides a way of mitigating the effects of job protection legislation and opens up 
the possibility of adjusting numbers rapidly to meet changing demand. For employees, by 
contrast, this kind of temporary employment is very much a ‘second-best’ form of employment 
with its built-in precariousness. Short-term and temporary employment has become 
increasingly prevalent in France, and fixed term work may constitute up to 80% of new hires 
(OECD 2014).  However, as with any change in dominant forms of practice, the use of 
temporary work may be accelerated by ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Dore 2008), who may not only 
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seek to increase the portion of temporary labour through the natural ebb and flow of people, but 
take more aggressive measures to alter the existing composition of the workforce, testing the 
limits of regulation. It may be that pressure from PE investors from LMEs to facilitate 
anticipated downsizing will lead to firms increasing the proportion of temporary and fixed term 
employment more rapidly than their French counterparts. This provides a more nuanced 
contextualisation for the first hypothesis.  Hence,  
H1i: The presence of temporary workers is significantly higher in foreign PE backed 
firms than in French firms with no PE involvement. 
H1ii: The presence of temporary workers in French PE backed firms is 
indistinguishable from French firms with no PE involvement.   
Compensation  
Apart from moving towards short-term contracts, two other ways that firms can reduce their 
interdependence with their people is by holding salaries down and cutting staff development 
and training.  There is a body of existing research that suggests that PE is likely to lead to, at 
least, constraints on compensation levels and perhaps even to cuts in wages (Appelbaum & Batt 
2014; Goergen et al. 2014). Organizational factors (Balkin & Gomez-Mejia 1987) and 
environmental factors (Milkovitch & Newman 2008) influence compensation, not only the 
level of salaries but also the compensation structure. Werner et al. (2005) show the impact of 
ownership structure on the pay of all employees.  The use of bonuses is a widespread 
mechanism for maximising shareholder value, in order to make for greater wage flexibility 
(Jackson et al. 2005; Conway et al. 2008); it shifts a greater proportion of the risks onto the 
employee (Lazonick & Mazzzucato 2013).  However, if the foreign PE investors are 
particularly concerned with short term value release, they may press for immediate pay cuts, 
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even if they combine them with measures to introduce greater insecurity into reward systems. 
Hence, 
H2i:  Restriction, freezing or decrease of compensation levels is more common in 
foreign PE backed firms than in French firms with no PE involvement. 
H2ii: Restriction, freezing or decrease of compensation levels in French PE backed 
firms is indistinguishable from French firms with no PE involvement. 
Training  
Turning to staff development, any kind of training requires the investment of time and 
resources, including financial resources. Training is the exemplar HRM activity for defining 
whether a firm is adopting a policy of value enhancement, which would involve improving 
workforce capabilities (Guery & Pendleton 2016), or short-termist redistribution, which would 
involve cutting training costs (Goergen et al. 2012). France is one of the countries where firm 
involvement in vocational education and training tends to be high. Until recently French law 
required firms with more than 20 employees to invest at least 1.6% of the total payroll in 
employee training. LME firms generally have much less involvement in staff development 
(Busemeyer & Trampusch 2012; Goergen et al. 2012). Even if the level of spending on training 
is quite high in French firms whoever the shareholders are, we can expect that foreign private 
equity investors tend to reduce training costs to come closer to the LME’s training practices 
and to improve short-termist finances.  On the contrary, we do not expect French PE investors 
to cut training expenses because they are more embedded in the institutional setting. Therefore 
we anticipate that: 
H3i: Reduction in spending on training is more common in foreign PE backed firms 
than in French firms with no PE involvement. 
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H3ii: Reduction in spending on training in levels in French PE backed firms is 
indistinguishable from French firms with no PE involvement. 
5. Methodology 
Data and Variables Definitions 
These theoretical hypotheses are tested using the French 2010-2011 REPONSE survey, 
conducted by DARES (the research department of the Ministère du travail, de l’emploi, de la 
formation professionnelle et du dialogue social or Ministry of Labour). This is a nationally 
representative establishment-level survey. The initial sample includes 4,000 establishments 
with 11 employees or more, excluding the agricultural sector. We excluded public 
administration, educational social and health sector, the financial sector, companies whose 
employees are the main shareholders (as in workers’ co-operatives) and listed companies, in 
order to ensure coverage of establishments that could be funded by private equity to develop 
their activity (Wood & Wright 2010). In order to be sure that the establishments in our sample 
are potentially involved with private equity funding but not venture capital funding, we 
excluded organizations less than five years old and those with less than 50 employees. Finally, 
we did not keep establishments that belong to foreign companies, because foreign headquarters 
can influence work and employment practices in their subsidiaries (Almond 2011). This 
database allows us to compare foreign and French PE backed firms with a control group of 
companies whose work and employment practices are not influenced by foreign headquarters. 
This gave us a resultant sample of 964 establishments. 
The REPONSE survey asks whether majority ownership is held by a financial company 
(alternative investor). The alternative investor ecosystem encompasses private equity, venture 
capital, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), and hedge funds. Hedge funds invest in a very wide 
range of asset classes; in seeking high returns, they rarely seek a majority shareholding or 
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outright control of a company, but rather take advantages of short term movements in share 
prices (Coffee & Palia 2016).  Activist hedge funds seek a change in managerial direction, but 
their influence on quotidian managerial practice is indirect and again, typically as a minority 
shareholder in listed firms (Coffee & Palia 2016).  Sovereign Wealth Funds are intended to 
represent an intergenerational governmental savings device for forex windfalls; here the 
existing literature suggests their impact on work and employment will be limited (Gospel et al. 
2014) or, in the case of the Norwegian one, which has an explicitly ethical brief, positive (Wood 
et al. 2017).   Again, in most instances, SWFs hold only a very small minority of shares (Wood 
et al. 2017).  An exception is France, which has its own SWF type fund, the Strategic Investment 
Fund, whose focus is on co-investment in strategically important firms, (rather than assuming 
overall control as PE typically does), albeit that, in comparative terms, it represents quite a 
small player (Todd 2011).  Private equity is different to the previous types of alternative investor 
in that they normally take a majority shareholding and then delist the company (and, hence, 
constitutes the overwhelming majority of unlisted firms with financial company majority 
ownership encompassed by REPONSE), and seeks to release value through explicitly imparting 
a fresh direction in managerial behaviour (Goergen et al. 2014).  Again, a focus on unlisted 
firms eliminates those that are subject to cross shareholding by banks that also provide loans, 
which is traditionally identified as a feature of CMEs (Hardie et al. 2013). Hence, in this article, 
for analytical ease, we refer to PE, but recognise that our sample could potentially encompass 
the relatively small number of instances where another type of alternative investor assumes 
overall control.  Venture capital - which invests in early stage companies - is excluded from 
this study (we exclude small and young firms, apart from as a robustness check)2.  
The REPONSE survey is mainly concerned with industrial relations and human resource 
management practices, but it is also, to our knowledge, one of the very few databases that 
includes information on the ownership status of French companies, both listed and non-listed. 
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A question asked of one top manager per establishment allows us to know whether ownership 
is private equity or other shareholders like family, a non-financial company or others. Another 
question relates to the nationality of the shareholder: French or foreign. In our sample, 9.23% 
of the establishments belong to companies funded by French PE and 8.30% to companies 
funded by foreign PE. This variable does not allow us to know the country of origin of foreign 
PE. However, analysing data included in the CFNEWS database about private equity 
acquisitions of French companies in 2010 reveals that more than 85% of the foreign investments 
come from LMEs (mainly the UK and the USA). We can therefore be confident that ‘foreign 
PE’ in the REPONSE survey mainly refers to LME PE firms. Although foreign PEs seem to 
invest in larger and older targets than French PEs (see Table 1), the results of difference in 
means tests between the characteristics of firms funded by French PE and firms funded by 
foreign PE gives a more nuanced picture. Indeed, some differences exist between these two 
groups, but they are infrequently statistically significant (except mainly for industry). We can 
therefore be confident that French PE and foreign PE are present in similar kinds of 
establishments, even if differences in industry could perhaps explain some differences in our 
outcomes. 
A first important variable for our study in order to test H1 is a proxy for contingent employment, 
that is to say the presence of temporary workers (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics of the 
main variables, and differences between non-funded establishments, establishments funded by 
French PE, and establishments funded by foreign PE). A dummy representing the use of 
restriction, freezing or decrease of compensation to assist the firm during economic crisis is 
used for testing H2. For testing H3, we focus on the changes in training expenses during the 
last three years. More precisely, the variable is the presence of a decrease of the training 
expenses level, relatively to the total payroll. 
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As management practices of PE backed firms may be affected by some characteristics of the 
parent firm (size, multi-unit or not) and of the establishment (age, industry, composition of the 
workforce), all these factors are controlled by dummy variables (see, for example, Davis et al. 
2011). Employment management, training expenses, as well as compensation policies may be 
influenced by the presence of a trade union (Bennett & Kaufman 2007). We control therefore 
for trade union presence in the establishment. Four positions are used for industries (industrial 
sector; wholesale and retail trade; services; others), six for the parent firm size (50-99 
employees; 100-199; 200-499; 500-999; 1000-4999; 5000 and more), and four for the age of 
the workplace (5-9 years; 10-19; 20-49; 50 and more). ‘Mono-unit’ and ‘union representative 
in the workplace’ are dummies. The ‘skills ratio’ is also a dummy, with 1 when managers and 
engineers are the main category of employees, 0 if others. Descriptive statistics for all these 
variables, for the whole sample and across the different categories of ownership can be found 
in Table 1. Tetrachoric correlations were computed for all the variables used in our analysis 
and no significant problems have emerged. 
Propensity Score Matching Method 
In order to analyse the impact of foreign and French Private Equity investment on work and 
employment relations in French firms, we estimate a ‘causal treatment effect’ (Rubin 1974) of 
private equity on contingent employment, compensation and training, differentiating between 
French PE and foreign PE3. We use a matching method, initially used in medical studies, for 
assessing the causal effect of a treatment (here, being funded by French PE, or by foreign PE) 
on the work and employment practices we are concerned with. This method consists of 
matching a treated entity with a non-treated entity with similar characteristics, in order to 
compute the average effect of the treatment on the treated. It is easy to find similar entities 
taking into account two or three characteristics, but much more difficult with more 
characteristics. Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) proposed therefore not to use the characteristics 
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themselves for matching entities, but a propensity score, that is to say the probability for an 
entity to receive the treatment regarding their characteristics. In this article, we test the effect 
of two ‘treatments’ (i.e. French PE funding and foreign PE funding). Two probit models are 
therefore used to estimate: 1) the propensity score of being funded by French PE; 2) the 
propensity score of being funded by foreign PE. This includes, as the dependent variable the 
dummy for private equity ownership, and as explanatory variables, the characteristics of the 
establishment and of the parent firm noted above. 
As propensity score matching enables us to adjust the selection bias (i.e. on average, companies 
funded by PE do not have the same characteristics as non-funded companies), we can compare 
work and employment practices between establishments that are as similar as possible, except 
for the fact than one establishment (treatment group) is part of a company funded by French 
private equity and the other is neither funded by PE nor belongs to a foreign company (control 
group). The same procedure is then replicated for establishments that are part of a company 
funded by foreign PE. Propensity score matching has become a popular approach to estimate 
causal treatment effects in non-experimental causal studies (Caliendo & Kopeinig 2008). It is 
used for example when evaluating labour market policies (Heckman et al. 1997) or the effect 
of unionisation on wages (Eren 2007). 
Several methods can be used for matching the establishments of the treated group to similar 
establishments in the control group. There is no clear evidence about how to choose the 
matching method and it is therefore sensible to use a number of approaches, even if some 
authors consider that kernel matching is the more reliable (Frölich 2007). We use therefore a 
number of them as a robustness check: the classical nearest-neighbour matching and two kernel 
matching functions (Gaussian kernel and Epanechnikov kernel)4. With growing sample size, 
these methods should become closer to comparing exact matches (Caliendo & Kopeinig 2008). 
Country of Origin and Private Equity 
 16 
The last step of the methodology consists in comparing the matched establishments with respect 
to their objectives, their training practices, employment practices and compensation practices, 
in order to analyse the hypothesized effects of private equity. The ATT (average treatment 
effect on the treated) is then computed by averaging for each outcome the differences between 
matched establishments. Bootstrapping (Lechner 2002) is used for testing the statistical 
significance of effects for kernel matching (Caliendo & Kopeinig 2008), and the Abadie & 
Imbens (2004, 2008) method for nearest-neighbour matching. 
This procedure is firstly used to estimate the effect of French private equity on the presence of 
temporary workers, then the effect on compensation practices (individual bonuses, collective 
bonuses, profit sharing, employee share ownership, and restriction, freezing or decrease of 
compensation as an approach to facing the economic crises), and the decrease of training 
expenses. It is afterwards replicated for foreign private equity. 
6. Findings 
Descriptives  
Table 2 describes difference in means tests for French PE funded versus non-funded 
establishments, then for those funded by foreign PE versus non-funded establishments. In other 
words, it enables us firstly to compare non-funded to funded establishments, then to see if there 
are differences between French-funded and foreign-funded establishments. 
There are clear and significant differences in training expenses, temporary employment, 
compensation practices and restrictions between establishments funded by foreign PE and non-
funded establishments, whereas the differences between establishments funded by French PE 
and non-funded establishments are very weak and not significant.  The presence of temporary 
workers and the decrease of training expenses are even slightly less common in French PE 
Country of Origin and Private Equity 
 17 
backed establishments (respectively 43.8% and 5.7%) than in non-funded establishments 
(44.6% and 7.3%). Differences are much more significant with foreign PE funded 
establishments. In these establishments, there is a stronger pressure to favour the presence of 
temporary workers (61.2%), to decrease training expenses (19.2%), and to use restriction, 
freezing or decrease of compensation as a means of facing economic crises (70% versus 50.3% 
for non-funded establishments).  
Causal treatment effect of French and foreign private equity (propensity score matching) 
The results of propensity score matching clearly highlight the influence of foreign PE on 
temporary employment, compensation and training expenses. Our first hypotheses (H1i and 
H1ii) are confirmed: Whereas French PE investors do not have any influence on insecure 
labour, foreign PE favours the use of temporary contracts. All the three matching algorithms 
clearly lead to convergent significant results at the 5% level (Table 3). 
Our second hypotheses (H2i and H2ii) dealt with compensation practices. The results of PSM 
methods are again clear-cut (Table 4). Establishments funded by French PE investors did not 
use ‘restriction, freezing or decrease of compensation’ during economic crisis more than non-
funded establishments. By contrast, foreign PE firms favour their use, reflecting a desire to 
control or reduce the total payroll. This result is significant at the level of 1% according to the 
nearest-neighbour matching method and the two kernel matching methods (Gaussian and 
Epanechnikov).  
Our last hypotheses (H3i and H3ii) are that French PE firms are much less likely to reduce 
spending on training than foreign PE firms. Our results (Table 5) show that French PE funded 
establishments are not more likely to reduce training expenses than establishments not funded 
by PE, whilst foreign PE investment is related to a decrease on spending on training and 
development. The three PSM methods are convergent with significant results at the level of 5% 
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for the two kernel matching methods, at 10% with the nearest-neighbour matching method. H3i 
and H3ii are supported by our results. 
7. Discussion and conclusions 
Our findings provide strong evidence for the country of origin effects in private equity 
investment. We found that constraints on contingent employment, compensation levels and 
training expenses differed based on PE investors’ country of origin.  This suggests there is not 
a single model of private equity.  Even if there are dominant trends in the global capitalist 
ecosystem, new financial actors continue to face varying constraints according to national 
contexts and their relative embeddedness.   
Foreign PE investors were associated with reduced training expenses, employment and 
constraints on pay. This supplements the findings of Appelbaum, Clark and others (Clark 2009; 
Appelbaum et al. 2013), who argue that PE results in the breach of contracts.  However, our 
study reveals that it is PE country of origin that influences the strategy imposed on the target 
firm, rather than PE per se.  French PE investors seem more inclined to ‘let managers get on 
with their job’ and/ or support an established national recipe. Explanations of these differences 
may be that either PE behaviour reflects country of origin effects and/ or that indigenous players 
have denser and thicker ties to other local actors and, hence, are more inclined to concur with 
local norms, and, as noted above, temper excessively short-termist behaviour (c.f. Jackson & 
Deeg, 2008; Morgan, 2012). Indeed, given that French PE partnerships are generally smaller 
than American or British ones, syndication is wider used. Consequently, the same pools of 
French investors in PE frequently participate in deals involving each other.  Evangelizing 
hardline approaches to organized labour and promoting job cuts may play well with some 
international investors, but are likely to alienate French PE actors with strong ties to the state.  
Again, many French investors are committed to good relations with stakeholders; even those 
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that do not will have to take this seriously if they are not to be shunned by potential syndicate 
partners. They are therefore implicitly encouraged to avoid hardline approaches of human 
resource management, which could generate negative effects in terms of poor industrial 
relations that might make managers’ work more difficult and jeopardise the public image of the 
firm. Those with a poor or diminishing reputation will battle to engage in future syndication 
(Wright and Lockett 2003; Sahlman 1990). However, this would discount the effects of agency: 
as Simmel (1980) notes, the choices made by actors reflect both objective choices and 
subjective reinterpretations thereof (Lane & Wood 2012).  Socio-economic conditions may 
make it harder to adopt very short termist HRM policies in France, but our research indicates 
that for determined foreign owners it is not impossible.    
Hence, an important question for future research would be whether French PE investors would 
behave the same way when they invest outside of France. Our findings reveal that foreign 
(mostly LME) PE is more likely to drive more hard-line approaches to managing people in the 
businesses it invests in, but indigenous PE is less likely to do so.  This underscores the 
relationship between broader political economy, and the relative embeddedness of different 
players in the PE ecosystem therein. Corporate governance reflects a wide range of contextual 
dynamics, and clearly there is need for further qualitative and micro-level work on why 
indigenous PE would be less likely to be concerned with short term value release and breaching 
psychological contracts with employees than their foreign counterparts.   
Our research does have limitations, mainly those created by the use of the particular data source. 
Whilst this gives us confidence that our survey is representative and reflects an accurate picture 
of all but the smallest French businesses, it would have been interesting to have more data on 
the financial history and situation of each firm. We have compared our discussion with the 
literature and drawn much of our analysis from the Anglo-Saxon PE industry while the data is 
from ‘foreign’ firms per se, albeit in an industry that originated in, and remains dominated by 
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players from LMEs.  Whilst the vast majority of the foreign PE in France is from LME 
countries, it would have been preferable to have been able to separate out the small number of 
non-LME investors.   
Propensity score matching enables us to compute ‘causal treatment effect’ based on cross-
sectional data. However a limitation of this method is that additional observable or 
unobservable characteristics could differ between the ‘treated’ observations and their 
counterparts in the control group. As a consequence, it is still difficult to establish causality 
links using cross-sectional data. The use of panel data in future researches might overcome this 
limitation. 
It would also be valuable to compare the effects of changes in work and employment relations 
policies on long-term organisational performance; in other words, does a shift to more hard-
line HRM policies leave the firm better or worse off in the longer term? Finally, it is recognized 
that, as with the alternative investor community at large, PE is, in itself, a diverse ecosystem. 
A key distinction here is between institutional buyouts (IBOs), where the PE buyer replaces the 
managerial team and strategy), managerial buy ins (MBIs), where a prospective new managerial 
team arranges outside PE funding to make a takeover possible, and MBOs (where the existing 
managerial team secures PE funding to take over the firm) (Wood & Wright 2010).  Existing 
work would suggest that IBOs and MBIs have significantly worse consequences for employees 
than MBOs (ibid.; Goergen et al. 2014); a more detailed study comparing these different 
manifestations of PE in France would provide further insights into country of domicile effects 
and the relative pull of different institutional domains. 
Nevertheless, the results are unequivocal. French private equity investors tend to follow the 
national recipe and maintain employment, pay and conditions and employee training and 
development broadly in line with other French companies, presumably with the aim of 
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developing the assets and making money from long-term growth and expansion. This may 
partially be explained by the degree of state support for private equity when it serves national 
or regional developmental objectives (c.f. Gaspar 2012).  In contrast foreign PE investors are 
associated with the use of more contingent policies, with lower levels of investment in people, 
presumably with the aim of extracting as much short-term value as possible.    
This leaves us with outstanding questions, and an outstanding research agenda: is the influence 
of indigenous PE similarly comparatively benign in other CMEs? Is French PE similarly benign 
when it is exported to other countries? Is the influence of LME PE similarly negative in other 
countries? The answers to these questions remain for further empirical research but may well 
have significant implications for the investment strategies of governments, particularly in 
developing nations.   At a theoretical level, this would indicate that investor country of origin 
may have just as strong effects as where a firm is headquartered and/ or confirm that indigenous 
players are more likely to fit in with national recipes owing to their denser ties with local 
players.  This confirms the relevance of socio-economic approaches to comparative institutional 
analysis, which place the relative embeddedness of players within specific national contexts at 
the heart of their analysis (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Jackson & Deeg, 2008).  It also confirms the 
distinct nature of French capitalism, and that even if delisting may open opportunities to alter 
work and employment practices, local players continue to opt for the dominant national recipe 
(even if the latter may itself be in a process of broader change).  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of establishments characteristics 
 
 
 Global 
sample 
Freq. 
Non 
funded 
establishm
ents 
Freq. 
French PE 
backed 
establish
ments 
Freq. 
Foreign 
PE backed 
establishm
ents 
Freq. 
Difference 
in means 
between 
French 
and 
foreign PE 
backed 
establishm
ents (t-
stat) 
Industry      
    Industrial sector 0.321 0.324 0.202 0.425 -3.208*** 
   Wholesale and retail 
trade 
0.390 0.405 0.382 0.250 2.689*** 
   Services 0.221 0.198 0.348 0.312 0.491 
   Others  0.068 0.073 0.068 0.013 -2.309** 
Parent firm size      
   50 - 99 employees 0.197 0.221 0.114 0.051 1.465 
   100 - 199 employees 0.197 0.214 0.126 0.115 0.215 
   200 - 499 employees 0.196 0.192 0.218 0.217 0.006 
   500 - 999 employees 0.141 0.138 0.149 0.153 -0.078 
   1000 - 4999 
employees 
0.151 0.127 0.264 0.269 -0.070 
   5000 and more 0.114 0.105 0.126 0.192 -1.157 
Age of the establishment      
   5 to 9 years 0.094 0.089 0.147 0.088 1.172 
   10 to 19 years 0.213 0.197 0.340 0.227 1.614 
   20 to 49 0.437 0.444 0.363 0.443 -1.042 
   50 and more 0.254 0.268 0.147 0.240 -1.522 
Mono-unit 0.370 0.384 0.370 0.225 2.075** 
Skills ratio 0.081 0.062 0.213 0.125 1.524 
Union representative in 
the establishment 
0.579 0.553 0.651 0.762 -1.578 
* if p < 0.10; ** if p < 0.05; *** if p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Country of Origin and Private Equity 
 32 
Table 2. Univariate difference in means tests 
 
  Difference in Means 
Tests between non 
funded establishments 
and establishments 
funded by French PE 
Difference in Means 
Tests between non 
funded establishments 
and establishments 
funded by foreign PE 
 
 
 
Non 
funded 
Funded by 
French PE 
t-stat : 
equal 
means 
Funded by 
foreign PE 
t-stat : 
equal 
means 
Presence of temporary 
workers 
0.446 0.438 0.157 0.612 -2.839*** 
Restriction, freezing or 
decrease of 
compensation during 
the last 3 years 
0.503 0.511 -0.146 0.700 -3.777*** 
Decrease of training 
expenses 
0.073 0.057 0.535 0.192 -3.644*** 
* if p < 0.10; ** if p < 0.05; *** if p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Propensity score matching – effect of French PE and foreign PE on contingent 
employment 
 
 Effect of French PE Effect of foreign PE 
 Effect SE OS Effect SE OS 
Presence of temporary workers       
   Nearest-neighbour matching -0.113 0.072 1 0.166** 0.065 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) 0.011 0.053 1 0.145** 0.059 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) 0.020 0.057 1 0.134** 0.058 0 
* if p < 0.10; ** if p < 0.05; *** if p < 0.01 
Notes: Standard errors for kernel matching algorithms (normal/Gaussian and Epanechnikov) 
are based on 200 bootstrap replications. Standard errors for nearest-neighbour algorithms are 
based on the method proposed by Abadie and al. (2004).  
OS (off support) indicates the number of treated individuals discarded because of missing 
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Table 4. Propensity score matching – effect of French PE and foreign PE on 
compensation 
 
 Effect of French PE Effect of foreign PE 
 Effect SE OS Effect SE OS 
Restriction, freezing or decrease of 
compensation during the last 3 years 
      
   Nearest-neighbour matching -0.079 0.082 1 0.225*** 0.065 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) -0.034 0.070 1 0.193*** 0.057 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) -0.051 0.066 1 0.179*** 0.058 0 
* if p < 0.10; ** if p < 0.05; *** if p < 0.01 
Notes: Standard errors for kernel matching algorithms (normal/Gaussian and Epanechnikov) 
are based on 200 bootstrap replications. Standard errors for nearest-neighbour algorithms are 
based on the method proposed by Abadie and al. (2004).  
OS (off support) indicates the number of treated individuals discarded because of missing 
 
 
Table 5. Propensity score matching – effect of French PE and foreign PE on training 
 
 Effect of French PE Effect of foreign PE 
 Effect SE OS Effect SE OS 
Decrease of training expenses       
   Nearest-neighbour matching -0.038 0.043 1 0.081* 0.061 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) -0.035 0.029 1 0.115** 0.047 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) -0.038 0.034 1 0.109** 0.049 0 
* if p < 0.10; ** if p < 0.05; *** if p < 0.01 
Notes: Standard errors for kernel matching algorithms (normal/Gaussian and Epanechnikov) 
are based on 200 bootstrap replications. Standard errors for nearest-neighbour algorithms are 
based on the method proposed by Abadie and al. (2004).  
OS (off support) indicates the number of treated individuals discarded because of missing 
 
 
Table 6. Private Equity and Work and Employment Relations, 
Probit regression, reporting marginal effects 
 
 Model 1 
Presence of 
temporary 
workers 
Model 2 
Restriction, 
freezing or 
decrease of 
compensation 
Model 3 
Decrease of 
training 
expenses 
PE funding    
   None Ref. Ref. Ref. 
   French PE -.002 
(.061) 
-.018 
(.060) 
-.020 
(.026) 
   Foreign PE .150** 
(.065) 
.187*** 
(.058) 
.093*** 
(.043) 
Industry    
   Industrial sector Ref. Ref. Ref. 
   Wholesale and retail trade -.405*** 
(.057) 
-.136** 
(.065) 
-.026 
(.031) 
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   Services -.460*** 
(.046) 
-.092 
(.068) 
-.0102 
(.032) 
   Others -.120* 
(.067) 
-.029 
(.064) 
.011 
(.033) 
Parent firm size    
   50 - 99 employees Ref. Ref. Ref. 
   100 - 199 employees .016 
(.056) 
-.016 
(.054) 
-.008 
(.027) 
   200 - 499 employees .064 
(.059) 
-.027 
(.056) 
.008 
(.031) 
   500 - 999 employees .200*** 
(.063)** 
-.047 
(.063) 
-.008 
(.032) 
   1000 - 4999 employees .152 
(.067) 
-.048 
(.065) 
.052 
(.043) 
   5000 and more .012 
(.078) 
-.149** 
(.070) 
 
.019 
(.043) 
Age of the establishment    
   Less than 10 years Ref. Ref. Ref. 
   10 to 19 years .075 
(.068) 
.013 
(.064) 
.050 
(.046) 
   20 to 49 -.057 
(.063) 
.012 
(.059) 
.000 
(.034) 
   50 and more .017 
(.068) 
.126** 
(.062) 
.057 
(.044) 
Mono-unit .056 
(.041) 
-.086** 
(.039) 
. 001 
(.027) 
Skills ratio .043 
(.072) 
.184*** 
(.061) 
.036 
(.040) 
Union representative .197*** 
(.037) 
.121*** 
(.037) 
.010 
(.019) 
Observations 944 944 944 
Log likelihood -547.645 -620.663 -247.968 
Pseudo R² 0.158 0.050 0.057 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.017 
*significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; ***significance at the 1% level 
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1 The French PE market is the second largest in Europe after the UK, with about €31.12 billion funds 
invested between 2009 and 2013 in 2939 companies (vs. €47.64 billion and 2351 companies for the UK) 
(EVCA – Essential Work 2014-2019; Private equity’s contribution to building European businesses). 
2 We then explored what would happen when we included younger firms and those less than five years 
old.  Suprisingly, the results were broadly similar, even though debt leverage would be much less 
significant in such instances (given less assets that could be used as collateral).  Although Venture 
Capital is often seen as having more benign effects on firms (Botozzi & Da Rin 2002), this did not 
appear to be the case.  This could reflect both the great variability of expertise in the Venture Capital 
industry, and an ultimate concern with value release within limited time horizons.   Full results of this 
additional analysis are available from the authors. 
3 In a first step we used probit models to test the link between French PE and all our dependant variables 
(the same for foreign PE). As probit models don’t identify causal links, propensity score matching 
method was preferred (for a comparison between these two methods, see Bryson et al., 2002). Results 
with probit models (in Appendix, Table 6) and results with propensity score matching are very 
consistent. 
4 See Caliendo & Kopeinig (2008), Heckman et al. (1997), Imbens (2004), Smith & Todd (2005) for 
overviews of matching methods. 
                                                 
